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11 Introduction
In practice, credit rationing is a prevalent phenomenon. Many borrowers cannot get the loans
they need even if they are willing to pay a higher interest rate than lenders are asking (Tirole
(2006)). This observed phenomenon deviates from the standard neoclassical assumption
which would predict that lenders can always increase the price, or the interest rate, of loans
to clear the credit market leaving no room for rationing. Therefore, the literature resorts
to imperfections in the credit markets to provide the rationale behind credit rationing, e.g.,
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. 1
Stiglitz and Weiss (henceforth SW) (1981) is among the most in￿uential papers in the lit-
erature.2 SW proposes a random credit rationing framework in which the interest rate or
collateral is excluded as a rationing device due to adverse selection and moral hazard ef-
fects and some apparently identical borrowers are randomly chosen to be credit rationed.
Of course, they do not argue that random rationing is always the case, but rather that the
conditions for the occurrence of random rationing are easily met so that it is signi￿cant in
the real world. This paper re-examines their work and derives two required conditions for
the occurrence of random rationing. A main conclusion is that random rationing occurs only
under extreme conditions and is therefore unlikely to be a prevalent phenomenon.
In the SW (1981) model, the bank partitions its borrowers into groups in terms of the
expected return of projects. Within each group, borrower risk is private information. For
a group of apparently identical borrowers, the expected return received by the lender does
not increase monotonically with the interest rate due to adverse selection and moral hazard
e￿ects. From the adverse selection perspective, a higher interest rate tends to attract high-
risk borrowers and hence leaves the bank with a worse customer pool; from the moral hazard
perspective, a higher interest rate induces the borrower to choose more risky projects. In
1For example, Ja￿ee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
2See Arnold and Riley (2009) for more discussions about the importance of the SW 1981 paper in Financial
Economics.
2both situations, increasing the interest rate will at some point reduce the bank’s expected
return resulting in a hump-shaped expected return function (see Figure 1). If excess demand
still exists at the bank-optimal interest rate, the interest rate will not be chosen as a rationing
device any more. Among these apparently identical borrowers, some are randomly rationed
even if they are willing to pay a higher interest rate. According to the model, random
rationing occurs at the turning point of the expected return function of the bank. Figure 1
illustrates three expected return curves respectively for three di￿erent borrower groups. In a
competitive credit market, the zero-pro￿t assumption of the bank means that only the group
represented by the solid curve will be randomly rationed. 3 This rationed group is called the
marginal group for which the bank breaks even only at the bank-optimal interest rate, b R.
The upper and lower curves respectively represent the not-rationed groups and groups that
are entirely rationed out of the market.
Figure 1: Credit Rationing in the sense of SW (1981)
In this paper, we construct a simple model generalizing the SW (1981) setting in order to
re-examine the possibility of random rationing.
First, we illustrate that the SW (1981) model is very sensitive to its assumption regarding
the ranking of projects under ￿nance. If the ranking is according to the mean-preserving
3The bank’s cost of funds is the deposit rate (see Figure 1).
3spread as in SW (1981), adverse selection is obvious because the lender and the borrower
have inverse pereference over these projects, while moral hazard does not exist because the
ranking by the borrower is determined ex ante. In the absence of moral hazard, risk-sorting
through collateral or the loan size may be achieved eliminating random rationing. 4 Even if
collateral or equity ￿nance is not available, Arnold and Riley (2009) document that random
rationing due to adverse selection occurs only under extreme conditions.
Second, by presuming the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard, we derive the
required conditions for the occurrence of random rationing in a setting more general than
that of SW (1981). On one hand, random rationing occurs only if the potential negative
e￿ects of the loan rate, collateral, and the loan size simultaneously overweigh their positive
e￿ects exactly at the current contracting level. In this case, the loan supply curve degenerates
to a single point and borrowers face a take-it-or-leave-it o￿er. On the other hand, random
rationing requires that the borrowers’ collateral amounts (or wealth) are positively correlated
with their risk. If this is the case, borrower classi￿cation according to wealth can solve the
rationing problem. We conjecture that these required conditions leave little room for the
signi￿cance of random rationing.
Third, we also examine the later models, SW (1986, 1992), that change the SW (1981)
model setting to justify random rationing. Our main conclusion is that two key assumptions
in these models are not intuitively reasonable and require further clari￿cations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We construct the model in section 2. In
section 3, we re-examine the SW models and analyzes the signi￿cance of random rationing.
In section 4, we conclude.
4For example, Bester (1985, 1987) and Besanko and Thakor (1987a) use collateral, while Besanko and
Thakor (1987b) and Milde and Riley (1988) use loan size, to achieve risk-sorting.
42 The Model
2.1 Model Setting
We consider a competitive credit market under imperfect information.
Projects
There is a continuum of indivisible investment projects making up a set 
. Each project is
characterized by a risk-parameter  and requires one unit of initial investment. Project 
has stochastic end-of-period payo￿ x() with distribution function F(x;) .
Lenders
Lenders in our model are risk-neutral ￿nancial intermediaries, e.g., banks, insurance compa-
nies, etc. They compete by o￿ering standard debt contracts, (D;R;C) where D is the loan
size, R is the gross loan rate and C is collateral. There could be some other debt variables as
well (e.g., debt covenants), but for simplicity they are ignored in our analysis. The loanable
funds come from depositors and is required to pay the deposit rate, . We assume all lenders
are identical so that a representative lender will be analyzed. In a competitive credit market,
the lender earns zero-pro￿t. For convenience, assume D = 1. Then the contract is written
as (R;C) where C  D.
Borrowers
We consider a large group of risk-neutral borrowers, or ￿rms, with limited liability. Borrower
j is endowed with a set 
j of projects where 
j  
. Each borrower will choose one project
to undertake if successfully obtaining the loan.
Information
The makeup of 
 and the return distribution of each project in 
 are common knowledge
for all agents in the market. However, 
j is only known to borrower j so that borrower j’s
5risk is hidden information both ex-ante and ex-post. 5 Due to this information imperfection,
all borrowers are apparently identical so that adverse selection and moral hazard may occur.
There are several important di￿erences between the SW model and ours. First, while in
the SW (1981) model the only changeable contract variable is either the interest rate or
collateral, we endogenize both simultaneously. 6 Second, the SW 1981 paper models adverse
selection and moral hazard separately, but here we combine both e￿ects in a synthesized
model. Third, in the SW adverse selection model, each borrower is endowed with only one
project. To address adverse selection and moral hazard simultaneously, our model allows
the opportunity set for each borrower to include more than one project. It is worthy of
notice that, except being more general, our model setting completely follows SW (1981).
This makes it possible for us to re-examine random rationing.
2.2 The Expected Payo￿s of the Contract Parties
For a given contract, (R;C), the borrower chooses which project to undertake. The expected
payo￿ of this project will be split between the two contract parties. Let the partition to the
borrower and the lender be B(x) and L(x) respectively. Then B(x) = maxf C;x   Rg
and L(x) = minfx+C;Rg. Clearly, B(x) is convex and L(x) is concave (see Figure 2 for
an illustration).








xdF(x;j) + F(;j)   R (1)
5Throughout the paper, ￿borrower risk￿ denotes the risk of the project undertaken by the borrower.
6The SW (1981) paper proposes separated models to exclude the interest rate and collateral as rationing
devices. This paper synthesizes both the SW interest rate model and the SW collateral model.




L(x)dF(x;j)    =
Z 
0
xdF(x;j)   F(;j) + R    (2)
where  = R   C. At (R;C), the slope of the indi￿erence curve of the borrower is
 F(R   C;)
1   F(R   C;)
< 0 (3)
for C < R. Similarly, it is easy to show that the slope of the indi￿erence curve of the lender
from an individual borrower, or from all borrowers in the considered group, is negative as
well. Therefore, the interest rate and collateral can be considered as substitutes for every
contract party given that the lender breaks even.
3 Re-examination of Random Rationing
Let’s ￿rst identify an uninteresting case of random rationing. Suppose a mass of borrowers
choose perfectly identical projects. If the loan supply does not su￿ce to ￿ll in the loan
demand from this mass of borrowers, random rationing might occur in the sense that some
of them are randomly chosen to be given credit but the others to be rationed. This is true
not only for the credit market but also for any kind of markets (e.g., eggs or desks). By any
7means, it is not a case worthy of study. Given a continuum of projects and a large number
of borrowers, we exclude the above case as a justi￿cation for the potential signi￿cance of
random rationing.
3.1 Sensitivity of Random Rationing to the Ranking of Projects
We ￿rst examine the case when the lender only considers o￿ering a single contract as SW
(1981) does. In the model, since the project set 
 is exogenously given, the ranking of
projects by the lender should also be exogenously determined. It might be impossible to
rank the projects by a simple rule, e.g., the ￿rst order stochastic dominance (FOSD), given
the exogenous distributions of project returns. However, to address incentive problems, we
impose constraints on 
 in order to rank the projects by a tractable rule proposed by the
lender. If two projects are not able to be ranked according to such a rule, let’s assume that
the lender treats them identically. Then all projects in 
 can be ranked according to the
rule.7
Assumption 1 (A.1): For the lender, the projects are ranked by a simple rule and the
ranking according to this rule exhibits no inconsistency, i.e., the ranking is identical across
contracts.
Lemma 1: (A.1) implies that the projects are ranked according to the second order stochas-
tic dominance (SOSD).
Proof: Suppose that in the ranking, 1 is preferred by the lender to 2 given any contract
(R;C), i.e., (R;C;1)  (R;C;2)
()
R 
0 xdF(x;1)   F(;1) + R    
R 
0 xdF(x;2)   F(;2) + R   
7Throughout the paper, when we say that a project is ￿more risky￿ than the other, we mean the latter is
preferred by the lender to the former. That is, for the lender, ￿risky￿ is interchangeable with ￿bad￿.
8()
R 
0 xd[F(x;1)   F(x;2)]  [F(;1)   F(;2)]




0 [F(x;1)   F(x;2)]dx  [F(;1)   F(;2)]
Then we get that for any contract (R;C), i.e., for all values of ,
Z 
0
[F(x;1)   F(x;2)]dx  0 (4)
Obviously this is just the de￿nition of the SOSD. Q.E.D.
In the credit rationing literature, it is common to assume an exogenously given rule to
rank the projects. For example, two special cases of the SOSD are discussed: the FOSD
(De Meza and Webb (1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987a)) and the mean-preserving spread
(MPS) (SW (1981)). Especially, (A.1) as an assumption generalizes the SW 1981 setting, so
it is appropriate given the purpose of our paper.
Let’s ￿rst follow the literature discussing the two special cases, the FOSD and the MPS.
Proposition 1 (P.1): If the ranking is according to the ￿rst order stochastic dominance,
there is no adverse selection when increasing the loan rate or the collateral requirement.
Proof: Recall (1) and (2). Given a project and a contract, the payo￿s of both contract
parties are non-decreasing on the end-of-period payo￿ of the project. Therefore, for any two
projects, 1 and 2, where 1 ￿rst-order stochastic dominates 2 , both the lender and the
borrower prefer 1 to 2.8 In other words, the rankings of the projects by the lender and
the borrower are identical given the FOSD as the rule of ranking. With the same ranking,
obviously there’s no adverse selection. Q.E.D.
De Meza and Webb (1987) assume that the distributions of project returns are special cases
8By the de￿nition of FOSD, any agent with increasing von-Neumann Morgenstern utility would prefer
the ￿rst-order stochastic dominant project.
9which can be ranked by the FOSD and then prove the absense of adverse selection. (P.1)
generalizes their conclusion.
Proposition 2 (P.2): If the ranking is according to the mean-preserving spread (MPS),
there is adverse selection in the sense that less-risky borrowers drop out ￿rst when increasing
the interest rate or the collateral requirement.
Proof: With MPS, the projects in 
 have the same expected return that will be split
between the two contract parties. With risk-neutrality, the game between the lender and the
borrower is a zero-sum game. Therefore, the lender and the borrower have inverse rankings
of projects resulting in adverse selection. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2a (P.2a): As long as all projects have the same expected return, there is
adverse selection. This conclusion is independent of the rule of ranking.
As a generalized version of (P.2), (P.2a) is immediate given that the ranking by the lender
is inverse to that by the borrower when all projects have the same expected return. Note
that under the MPS, the considered borrower group in our model can be thought as the
marginal group in the SW (1981) model and thus (P.2a) generalizes their adverse selection
model as well as the Wette (1983) model that addresses the negative adverse selection e￿ect
of collateral.
Figure 3 illustrates (P.1) and (P.2) in the case with two types of risk. Under the FOSD, it is
the more-risky borrower who drops out ￿rst when increasing the loan rate or the collateral
requirement and therefore there’s no adverse selection. In contrast, under the MPS, the
less-risky project drops out ￿rst resulting in adverse selection.
Proposition 3 (P.3): In the cases of both the mean-preserving spread and the ￿rst order
stochastic dominance, no moral hazard occurs.
10Figure 3: The Zero-pro￿t Curves of Borrowers
Proof: According to (P.1) and (P.2), the ranking of projects by the borrower is identical
to that by the lender under the FOSD and is inverse to that by the lender under the MPS.
Given (A.1), the ranking by the lender is independent of the signed contract in both cases, so
the ranking by the borrower is also independent of the signed contract. With predetermined
rankings, borrowers have no incentive to pursue risk-shifting excluding the possibility of
moral hazard. Q.E.D.
Let now consider the case when the lender can o￿er a family of contracts. Note that random
rationing pools di￿erent risks. In the absence of ex-post moral hazard, a branch of risk-sorting
models based on the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) introduce self-selection
mechanisms to obtain a separating equilibrium and hence eliminate random rationing. For
example, collateral and the loan size are illustrated as the sorting devices (e.g., Bester (1985)).
In the general case of the MPS, the Mirlees-Spence single-crossing condition does not hold
and hence perfect sorting cannot be achieved. Nevertheless, risk-sorting at least mitigates
rationing in some cases, e.g. the two-state case of Bester (1987).
One may argue that collateral or self-￿nance might be limited for some group of borrowers,
excluding the opportunity to use multiple contracts. Arnold and Riley (2009) ￿nd that,
even if collateral is excluded and a single contract is o￿ered, the expected return function
of the lender in the SW (1981) adverse selection model cannot be hump-shaped. The idea
11is straightforward. When the lender increases the loan rate, some less-risky borrowers drop
out resulting in a potential decrease of the expected return. If the lender continues to
increase the loan rate until only one type of borrowers remains and breaks even, the lender
earns the entire surplus of the remaining projects which is the maximum expected return
she can get. Therefore, the expected return function of the lender cannot be purely hump-
shaped. Two cases are possible: monotonically increasing or ￿rst hump-shaped and then
monotonically increasing. Based on this result, Arnold and Riley (2009) further illustrate
that random rationing occurs only under very extreme conditions. In sum, we get the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 (P.4): In the absence of moral hazard, random rationing occurs only under
very restrictive assumptions.
So far, (P.1) - (P.4) show that random rationing is very sensitive to the ranking of projects.
The following graph is a summary of these propositions:
Figure 4: Summary of the First Four Propositions
When the ranking is according to the FOSD or the MPS, there is no moral hazard. However,
in the absence of moral hazard, random rationing only occurs under extreme conditions. It is
easy to show that in the other cases of the SOSD, the rankings by the borrower might depend
on the given contract, restoring the possibility of moral hazard when increasing the interest
rate. In these cases, the information concerning both the expected return and the risk of
projects has to be asymmetric between the borrower and the lender. This deviates from the
SW (1981) setting that within a borrower group, all projects have identical observed returns
but hidden risk and that the ranking of these projects is according to the MPS. Namely,
12lenders ￿rst classify borrowers into many borrower groups in terms of the expected return of
their projects, and then within each group, rank the projects (or borrowers) by risk. 9 This
assumption makes their model more tractable. Ja￿ee and Stiglitz (1990) emphasize the rule
of the MPS as a general assumption to derive random rationing.
3.2 The Required Conditions for Random Rationing
As we argued in the previous subsection, the risk-sorting models and the Arnold and Riley
(2009) model to some extent exclude the potential signi￿cance of random rationing when
only adverse selection is present. However, these models do not solve the rationing problem
if adverse selection and moral hazard coexist. For this reason, some papers by Stiglitz argue
that the risk-sorting models are special or wrong (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1992), Stiglitz
(2001)). In this subsection, we presume the coexistence of adverse selection and moral
hazard. What we have in mind here is that, in some cases of the SOSD that have not been
well studied in the literature, this coexistence might allow for the occurrence of random
rationing in relatively general cases.
To exclude the loan rate as a rationing device, the expected return function of the bank
should not be monotonically increasing on the loan rate. In the literature, it seems to be
a common belief that a non-monotonic expected return function on the loan rate is also a
su￿cient condition for the occurrence of random rationing. 10 This is not true. If the lender
can choose any instrument other than the loan rate, e.g. collateral requirement or the loan
size, to clear the market, random rationing cannot occur. Therefore, random rationing does
require that, at the current contracting level, changing any contract term reduces the lender’s
expected return.
9It is an empirical issue whether expected returns are observable and how the lender classi￿es its borrowers
or loans. Although it is not clear how borrowers are classi￿ed in practice, risk ratings seem to play an
important role. Banks usually have their internal risk rating system to rate loans/borrowers.
10Much evidence comes from the many papers that claim the occurrence of random rationing based on
only a hump-shaped expected return function of the lender on the loan rate, e.g. due to bankruptcy cost.
13Proposition 5 (P.5): Random rationing occurs if and only if the potential negative e￿ects
of the loan rate, collateral and the loan size simultaneously overweigh their positive e￿ects
exactly at the current contracting level.
Note that (P.5) speci￿es the necessary and su￿cient condition for random rationing. In the
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model, the negative e￿ects include both adverse selection and moral
hazard, while the positive e￿ects are the direct increase of the lender’s expected return from,
ceteris paribus, a higher loan rate, higher collateral requirement and/or lower loan size. From
(P.5), we see that, only if excess demand still exists after lenders exhaust all the instruments
to ration credit, random rationing is possible. In this case, the zero-pro￿t curve of the lender
degenerates to a single point that is the optimal point of the expected return function of
the lender. With random rationing, the lender breaks even only at this point which is the
only choice of the lender and a take-it-or-leave-it o￿er to the borrowers. 11 SW (1992) also
proposes three required conditions for the occurrence of random rationing, among which the
second one is ￿the adverse selection/ adverse incentive e￿ects of changing interest rates or
the non-price terms of the contract must be su￿ciently strong (at some values of the relevant
variables) that it is not optimal for the lender to use these instruments fully to allocate
credit￿. This required condition is consistent with (P.5). Note that (P.5) holds under very
general setting even without (A.1).
De Meza and Webb (2006) ￿nd that random rationing implies in￿nite marginal cost of funds
to the borrower, so the borrower has an overwhelming incentive to cut their loans by a dollar
and avoid rationing. Their model endogenizes the loan size by assuming that borrowers are
able to access some self-￿nance through reducing current consumption, delaying the project
to collect internal funds, etc. Implicitly in their model, lenders can use the loan size or
self-￿nance to clear the market, i.e., decreasing the loan size or increasing self-￿nance at the
pooling contract bene￿ts the lender. From (P.5), we can see that this assumption itself has
11Note that for convenience, we exclude the case with a continuum of global maximum points.
14already excluded the possibility of random rationing.
It is natural to consider whether the condition in (P.5) can possibly hold only due to adverse
selection and moral hazard e￿ects in the sense of SW (1981). To investigate this issue, let us
￿rst derive another required condition for random rationing. Denote the equilibrium contract
with random rationing as (b R; b C). At (b R; b C), increasing the loan rate results in adverse
selection, so (b R; b C) must lie on the zero-pro￿t curve of at least one remaining borrower
and hence on the envelope curve of the the zero-pro￿t curves of all remaining borrowers
as illustrated in Figure 5. In the ￿gure, the dashed curve is the envelope curve. We only
Figure 5: The Envelope Curve of the Zero-pro￿t Curves of Borrowers
consider the interesting part with C  R. Note that borrowers’ zero-pro￿t curves are
negative-sloping, so the envelope curve is also negative-sloping.
Lemma 2: When changing the contract along the envelope curve to the right-down side
or along the line, R = C, to the right-up side, there is neither adverse selection nor moral
hazard.
Proof: Along the envelope curve to the right-down side: every remaining borrower earns
non-negative expected return, so they will stay in the borrowing group and there is no adverse
selection; with decreasing interest rate and increasing collateral, there is no incentive to raise
15risk and hence no moral hazard either. Moreover, given any contract along the line, R = C,
the lender and the borrower have the same ranking among all projects and, according to
(P.2) and (P.4), there is neither adverse selection nor moral hazard. Q.E.D.
Let (R0;C0) be the point of intersection between the envelope curve and the straight line,
R = C. Lemma 2 identi￿es a ￿path￿ along which adverse selection and moral hazard are
both irrelevant. Let’s move the contract along this path, i.e., ￿rst along the envelope curve
to the right-down side until (R0;C0) and then along the line, R = C, to the right-up side. It
is obvious that the lender eventually gets positive pro￿t under this movement, so there must
be another contract along the path that dominates (b R; b C). This contradicts with (b R; b C)
being the equilibrium contract. We thus conclude that random rationing cannot occur in
our above model setting.
It is worth emphasizing that collateral is implicitly assumed to be unlimited so far. This is
not true in reality. Borrowers have di￿erent wealth and hence di￿erent amounts of pledge-
able collateral.12 Along the above path, if less-risky borrowers drop out earlier due to the
limitation of availiable collateral, it is possible that increasing collateral requirement has a
negative e￿ect on the quality of the consumer pool like the negative adverse selection e￿ect.
This is a necessary condition for random rationing.
Proposition 6 (P.6): Random rationing occurs only if the borrowers’ collateral amounts
(or wealth) are positively correlated with their risk .
Information imperfection is the key to induce random rationing in the SW (1981) model.
It is plausible to assume that information concerning the risk of projects is asymmetric be-
cause the projects are implemented ex post so that the lender’s estimation of project risk is
based on the borrower’s description. However, wealth is a current state variable. In most
cases, wealth of a borrower can be observed by the lender. If wealth is a strong indicator
12We only consider outside collateral in the model as in SW (1981) and Wette (1983).
16of borrower risk, the lender can classify the borrowers according to their wealth and thus
eliminate, or at least mitigate, random rationing due to information imperfection over risk.
We conjecture that such a required condition, even if being logically possible, leaves little
room for the signi￿cance of random rationing. 13
One may think that collateral might be constrained exactly at the current contracting level
for the entire borrower group restoring the possibility of random rationing even without
the condition in (P.6). However, if some borrowers are rationed only because collateral
is a binding constraint, this is not random rationing due to information imperfection in
the sense of SW (1981, 1992). It is well documented in the literature that, for the poorly
collateralized ￿rms which are most likely to be rationed, collateral is a binding constraint
in debt ￿nance (Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Tirole (2006)). Are the poor-collateralized
￿rms credit rationed because lenders deny their application even if they are willing to pledge
more collateral or because collateral is a binding constraint in corporate ￿nance for these
￿rms? Note the two explanations are virtually di￿erent concerning the rationing forms. The
￿rst results in random rationing, while the second does not. Therefore, one way to test the
signi￿cance of random rationing is to examine whether the credit rationed borrowers are still
rationed if they are willing to pledge more collateral. To our knowledge, so far no research
on such a test has been done probably due to data availability.
3.3 The Stiglitz and Weiss 1986/1992 Models
To allow for the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard, Stiglitz and Weiss (1986,
1992) change the original setting in their 1981 model. These two papers are quite similar,
so we only consider the 1992 model here. The 1992 model has two key assumptions di￿erent
from the 1981 model: borrowers are risk averse and more wealthy borrowers are less risk
13As we will discussion in the next subsection, the SW (1992) model takes this required condition as an
assumption to justify random rationing.
17averse so that they take more risky projects.
If borrowers are risk averse, there is risk sharing bene￿t from the borrowing-lending relation-
ship and even under the MPS assumption, the ￿game￿ is no longer a zero-sum game. Let
u be the borrowers’ von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function where u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.





In (5), B(x) is convex but u is concave. There’s no conclusive property concerning the
concavity (or convexity) of u(B(x)) on x. Given that the lender has an identical ranking of
projects in 
 across contracts, is the ranking by the borrowers also identical across contracts
or, equivalent to say, is the ranking independent of the signed contract? The answer is no.
To give a simple illustration, let us ￿x the collateral requirement and think of changing the
loan rate only. Assume for simplicity that there are only two types of projects, high-risk and
low-risk. On one hand, u(B(x)) is concave for some contract   when the loan rate is low
enough while the collateral level is high enough, B(x) is close to be linear and u(B(x)) is
concave. In this case, the borrower and the lender have the same ranking. The borrower
earns lower expected return but higher expected utility from a low-risk project, so she still
prefers the low-risk project. On the other hand, the high-risk project may be chosen for
some other contracts   when the loan rate is high enough, the borrower earns nothing from
a low-risk project but still positive utility from a high-risk project. In sum, for a given
collateral level, there is a critical value of the loan rate below which the borrower prefers a
low-risk project to a high-risk one and over which the borrower prefers a high-risk project
to a low-risk one.14 This means that increasing the loan rate might induce risk-shifting
14It is intuitive that the critical value is increasing in the collateral level because increasing the collateral
requirement does reduce the incentive of borrowers to take risk. This conclusion in the Stiglitz and Weiss
(1992) model is summarized by a ￿switch line￿ along which the borrower is indi￿erent between the high-risk
and the low-risk projects, below which the low-risk is chosen and over which the high-risk is chosen.
18moral hazard. Therefore, the assumption of risk averse borrowers allows for the coexistence
of adverse selection and moral hazard which is a necessary condition for the signi￿cance of
random rationing. However, if borrowers are risk averse, why is the standard debt contract
chosen as the o￿ered contract by the lender? For risk-averse borrowers and risk-neutral
lenders, the optimal contract should allocate a ￿xed return to borrowers leaving lenders to
bear all the risk. Therefore, at equilibrium the exogenously given contract form cannot be
reconciled with the assumption of risk averse borrowers.
In addition, if more wealthy borrowers are less risk-averse so that they take more risky
projects, why do lenders not classify borrowers according to their wealth as we argued at the
end of the previous subsection? If wealth is a strong indicator of risk attitude of borrowers,
borrower classi￿cation according to the level of wealth should be pro￿table for the lender.
To sum up, two key assumptions in the SW (1992) model lack reasonable clari￿cation. When
these assumptions are relaxed, the 1992 model cannot justify random rationing. Thus the
conclusions we draw in the previous subsections are not undermined by the SW 1986/1992
models.
4 Concluding Remarks
To understand the rationale for credit rationing is of importance not only because of its prac-
tical signi￿cance but also because of its implication for the money transmission mechanism.
SW (1981) proposes a random credit rationing framework under imperfect information. In
this paper, we re-examine their model, derive required conditions for the occurrence of the
SW random credit rationing and conclude that, even if being logically possible, random
rationing only occurs under extremely strict conditions.
In general, empirical research does not ￿nd evidence in favor of the signi￿cance of random
rationing (e.g., Berger and Udell (1992)), which is consistent with the ￿nding of Riley (1987),
19Arnold and Riley (2009) and this paper. While the Stiglitz and Weiss adverse selection
model (1981) is based on ex-ante asymmetric information, many other models assume ex-
ante symmetric information and focus on illustrating how ex-post agency problems induce
credit rationing, e.g., costly state veri￿cation (Williamson (1987)), money diversion (Hart
and Moore (1994, 1998)), and hidden e￿ort (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). Hart and Moore
(1994, 1998) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) illustrate how poorly collateralized ￿rms can
be rationed because collateral (or net worth) is a binding constraint in corporate ￿nance.
Essentially, the rationale in these models is di￿erent from the SW random rationing. This
leaves a possible way to test the signi￿cance of random rationing by examining whether
the credit rationed borrowers are still rationed if they are willing to pledge more collateral,
reduce the loan size and/or accept restrictive covenants.
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